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Abstract
This article uses monthly data on bilateral trade in conjunction with monthly data on
terrorism events and associated fatalities to shed light on the impact of terrorism on
trade. Employing a structural model of trade, we provide evidence that, if at all,
international terrorism displays effects on bilateral and multilateral trade only in the
medium run (more than one and a half years after an attack/incident). The pure
short-run impact of international terror on trade appears very small, if not
negligible.
JEL classifications: D74, F14, F52, H56, O19
1. Introduction
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) entailed a psychological shock on hu-
mankind, which had huge consequences not only directly by way of a human tragedy for
the almost 3,000 victims and their relatives but also indirectly, for example, for those who
travel internationally by airplane. Thus it would be myopic to measure the impact of those
attacks primarily or only in economic terms and, in particular, in short-run responses of
economic outcome.
The literature on the consequences of terrorism for international business primarily, but
not only, focuses on international terrorism (which involves at least two countries) as an
obstacle to the cross-border economic activity—of investment, tourism, or trade. For in-
stance, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) find in a cross-section of 110 countries that an in-
crease in terrorist risk at large by 1 standard deviation results in a drop of the net foreign
direct investment (FDI) position of about 5% of GDP for the average economy. Enders and
Sandler (1996) report even larger effects for Spain and Greece but no such effects for
France, (Western) Germany, and Italy. Enders et al. (2006) focus on US FDI especially after
9/11 and find that except for Turkey the adverse effects on US FDI flows were short-lived.
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Enders et al. (2006) also report a significant but small reduction of US FDI stocks in OECD
countries. Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) find large effects of terrorism on output per capita
for Israel.
Enders et al. (1992) estimate the cumulative tourism-related losses due to terrorism at
$16 billion in continental Europe between 1974 and 1988. However, in 1988 alone the
tourism-related revenues were $74 billion, so the aforementioned cumulative number ap-
pears relatively small in pure economic terms. Drakos and Kutan (2003) confirm the nega-
tive effect of terrorism on tourism for Greece, Israel, and Turkey using monthly data for
1991–2000. Additionally, they find support for significant spillover effects. Regarding
cross-border flows of people, Dreher et al. (2011) find terrorism to act as a push factor for
skilled migrants leading to a brain drain. Moreover, a number of papers find significant
and in part sizable effects of international terrorism on the cross-border trade of goods. The
next section is devoted to a more detailed discussion of that work.
Most of the research identifying significant disruptive economic effects of terrorism ana-
lyzes selected countries with repeated events over longer time spans (most notably Israel,
the Basque country, or Ireland). Hence, deriving conclusions from those cases for the aver-
age terror event may be misleading. For instance, virtually all attempts made to quantify
the pure economic effects of the attacks of 9/11 led to small numbers at least in the longer
run (e.g., Chernick, 2005; Bloom, 2009). In that regard, Globerman and Storer (2009) find
that there was a reduction of both US exports to and imports from Canada in the aftermath
of 9/11. However, the impact of 9/11 on trade is difficult to discern from that of a brief re-
cession in the USA between March and November 2001. The causal impact on interna-
tional goods transactions with the USA after the attacks was virtually zero, and the effect
was mostly seen in a short-term reduction of airborne travels to and from the USA as a con-
sequence of the canceling of flights for several days. Clearly, with the attacks of 9/11 having
been by far the most significant events of their kind, we would not expect much smaller in-
dividual events—in terms of the number of fatalities or their media echo—to have had big-
ger purely economic effects.
The aim of this article is to address two potential shortcomings in earlier work of terror-
ism on international trade: one relating to measurement error through time aggregation
bias (an attribution of changes in economic outcome at an earlier point in time to terrorism
events at a later point in time) and a second one relating to general equilibrium effects of
terrorism. We address the first issue by using monthly data on international terror events to
quantify their impact on subsequent international trade within time windows of up to two
years. The second issue—existence of general equilibrium effects—is addressed by estimat-
ing a structural model of bilateral trade that explicitly accounts for general equilibrium
(i.e., direct bilateral trade destruction as well as third-country trade diversion) effects of ter-
rorism on trade. Clearly, in case that terrorism affects GDP—which is a key determinant of
bilateral trade—quantifying effects of terrorism on bilateral trade requires respecting gen-
eral equilibrium effects by way of a simultaneous impact of terrorism on trade and income.
The findings suggest that economic effects through a disruption of international goods
trade are very small, in particular, in the short run when using unilateral terror measures
(i.e., measuring the effects of terrorism in importing and exporting countries). This finding
is not driven by the inclusion or exclusion of countries that received most of the attacks. It
turns out that the difference between the small effects identified in this study and the large
effects identified in earlier work is indeed due to both time aggregation bias (using annual
rather than monthly data) and the neglect of general equilibrium effects in earlier work.
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We review the literature on trade effects of terrorism in detail in the next section.
Section 3 outlines the theoretical foundation for our analysis, and Section 4 describes the
data. Our results are presented in Section 5, and the final section concludes.
2. Previous literature
A number of papers address the topic of how terrorism affects international trade. In
general, the literature on effects of terrorism on international trade views terrorism as one
example of an iceberg-type (i.e., an ad valorem variable) trade cost factor. Such costs are
supposed to exert a negative effect on the volume of bilateral trade by raising insecurity of
trade transactions, by disrupting trust in international business relations, by physically
destroying transport infrastructure and even goods themselves or the supply of production
factors (see Bandyopadhyay and Sandler, 2014), and by rendering cross-border transactions
more costly through the increased requirement of security standards.
The first paper in that vein is Nitsch and Schumacher (2004). The authors employ a
reduced-form cross-sectional gravity model of bilateral trade—with exports plus imports as
the dependent variable—for the years 1968–1979 and incorporate the sum of two trading
partners’ (log one plus) total terror attacks as a determinant of bilateral trade (alternatively,
they use an indicator variable reflecting whether both countries experienced at least one
terror attack or measures of other events of political violence). The authors report that a
doubling of a pair’s terror attacks reduces its total bilateral trade by 4%.
Blomberg and Hess (2006) estimate two variants of a gravity model to assess effects of
terrorism on bilateral trade—with exports plus imports divided by two as the dependent
variable—using annual panel data for the period of 1968–1999. Terrorism is measured by
a binary indicator variable taking the value of 1 if at least one terrorist event was recorded
for either country in a trading pair and year. The authors report that bilateral trade falls by
5–6% if a pair experiences at least one terror incident. Terror is estimated to have a tariff
equivalent of 0.65% to 1.46% under reasonable assumptions.
Mirza and Verdier (2008) formulate a structural model of bilateral trade with terrorism
as one of its (trade-cost–like) determinants. They point to four main issues affecting previ-
ous work (see Mirza and Verdier, 2008, p.181): omitted variables bias; persistence of terror
and its indirect effect on trade via GDP (a general equilibrium effect as already mentioned);
ignorance of a difference between location, target, and perpetrator effects; and a potential
bias accruing to reverse causation between terror and trade through the use of terrorism
security measures. However, earlier work demonstrated that trade is not a robust determin-
ant of terrorism, so that reverse causation of international terrorism and trade seems of
minor importance (see Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011).
De Sousa et al. (2009) use bilateral US panel data at the four-digit Standard
International Trade Classification (SITC) level from 1993 to 2002 and analyse the effect of
terror against the USA on US imports, focusing on the effect of terror attacks in countries in
close proximity to the exporting partner. They find that both terror attacks in the exporting
partner and in neighbors of the exporter reduce US imports.1 Each attack is estimated to
reduce trade by about 1% when happening in the exporting country and by about 0.5%
when happening in the exporter’s neighbouring countries.
1 Since that study focuses on the USA as an importer, effects of terror attacks on US soil are
included in the year fixed effect.
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De Sousa et al. (2010) employ a structural gravity model to assess how terror attacks
against the USA in the exporter’s neighbors may affect US imports over the time span
1993–2006. Relative to De Sousa et al. (2009), they employ a broader concept of (geograph-
ical and cultural) neighborhood to assess cross-border spillover effects of terrorism on inter-
national trade. They assess how terror attacks in an exporter’s neighbour affect US bilateral
imports from that exporter, as in De Sousa et al. (2009). They confirm a direct effect of
terrorism on bilateral trade, and they find that indirect negative effects of terror from third
countries affect US bilateral imports more if the third country is more similar to the exporter.
We may summarize earlier work as follows. First, empirical work used annual panel
data or cross-sectional data of trade and (contemporaneous) terrorism to identify the
impact of the latter on the former. Second, it mostly employed data on terrorism prior to
9/11. Finally, much of the theoretical and, in particular, the empirical literature on terror-
ism effects on trade views the effects to materialize via implicit effects on consumer prices
(through trade costs and income constraints). To the best of our knowledge, only
Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2014) highlight an additional channel through effects on the
supply and redistribution of factors across the sectors of an economy, apart from effects on
prices as present also in single-sector economies. In such a framework, Bandyopadhyay and
Sandler highlight that the effects of terrorism on trade are ambiguous. The goal of the
subsequent analysis is to avoid time aggregation bias and gain a better understanding of the
dynamic adjustment of trade to international terrorism by using monthly data on bilateral
trade and events data on terrorism, using a large bilateral panel data set which covers the
time span 1970–2008. This analysis will respect general equilibrium effects so that direct
and indirect (third-country and price as well as income) effects can be discerned.
3. A structural model of bilateral trade
We use a linearized structural general equilibrium model of international trade to assess the
effects of terrorism on monthly directed trade. Such a model has three virtues. First, it allows
assessing not only direct trade destruction effects of terrorism for countries and country-pairs
that are exposed to attacks. On the contrary, the model accounts for price (and income) reac-
tions by respecting income constraints (i.e., that total expenditures must equal total income),
consistent with general equilibrium. As a consequence, bilateral changes in trade costs—of
which terrorist attacks are a part (as in the literature summarized in Section 2)—induce not
only bilateral but also multilateral effects. In a nutshell, an increase in bilateral trade costs
(e.g., by way of additional terrorist attacks) induces direct negative trade destruction effects,
which are cushioned by accompanying, unilateral, negative price and income effects, which
affect terror-exposed countries’ trade with third countries. Second, it allows avoiding a time
aggregation bias of international terror effects on bilateral trade, since terror events later in
the year may not have an impact on trade flows earlier in the same year (the later is arguably
a major source of endogeneity). In particular, time aggregation bias appears relevant to the
extent that some of the trade cost–related aspects of terrorism—especially those related to
additional security measures—should be relevant only with delay to an attack. Finally, related
to the previous point, the proposed approach permits evidence on the timing of short- to me-
dium-term trade responses to terror attacks.
In broad terms, we follow Baier and Bergstrand (2009) with regard to the model struc-
ture. These authors provide a linearization to the estimating equation for bilateral exports
or imports as outlined in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), a structural gravity model of
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bilateral trade that is consistent with multi-country general equilibrium. For convenience,
and in line with earlier research, let us denote exporting countries by i¼1,. . ., I, importing
countries by j¼ 1,. . ., J, time (months) by t¼1,. . ., T. In our data with individual OECD
country exports, I¼ 30 J¼ 181, and T¼ 468.2 Let us use Xijt to denote aggregate nominal
sales of country i to country j at time t, Yit ¼
XJ
j¼1 Xijt to denote aggregate sales and
expenditures of country i at time t, and hit to denote country i’s expenditure or sales as a
share of world expenditure or sales at time t.3 The stochastic version of a general bilateral
export equation can thus be written as
ln
Xijt
YitYjt
¼ at þ ln~s1rijt þ uijt (1)
ln ~s1rijt ¼ ln s1rijt þ ln Pr1it þ ln Pr1jt (2)
 ln s1rijt 
XJ
i¼1
hitln s
1r
ijt
 !

XJ
j¼1
hjtln s
1r
ijt
 !
þ
XJ
j¼1
hithjtln s
1r
ijt
 !
: (3)
While the representation of the cross-border demand equation based on a gravity model as in
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) in eqs (1) and (2) is exact, the approximation of eq. (2) in
eq. (3) is the linearization of the model by Baier and Bergstrand (2009). In line with earlier
work, we assume that s1rijt in eq. (2) is a multiplicative function of K individual elements
which are indexed by k, s1rijt ¼
YK
k¼1 s
1r
kijt , and its kth element depends on the kth observable
trade-cost variable hkijt, s1rkijt ¼ hbkkijt. One element hkijt captures, for example, a specific interna-
tional terrorism variable at time t or some period earlier than that as a trade (or transaction)
cost. Moreover, bk measures the partial (or direct) effect of hkijt on
Xijt
YitYjt
. All estimates reported
in tables in the empirical analysis of this article will be estimates of bk. The elements in sijt are
measures of iceberg trade costs (Samuelson, 1952). at is a time-specific constant which captures
monthly and seasonal effects, and uijt is a stochastic disturbance term. Using the jargon of
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the variables Pit and Pr1jt are so-called exporter and im-
porter multilateral resistance terms, respectively. They measure weighted aggregate trade costs
per exporter and time and importer and time, respectively. More formally, Pit ¼XJ
j¼1 s
1r
ijt P
r1
jt hjt
  1
1r
and Pjt ¼
XJ
i¼1 s
1r
ijt P
r1
it hit
  1
1r
. This illustrates that the elasticity of
Xijt
YitYjt
with respect to sijt is not 1  r. By the same token, the elasticity of XijtYitYjt with respect to the
kth observable trade cost variable, hkijt, is not bk. Moreover, a reduced-form gravity model
that disregards general equilibrium would replace ln ~s1rijt by ln s
1r
ijt in eq. (1). Notice that the
difference between ln ~s1rijt and ln s
1r
ijt in the structural model roots in the acknowledgment of
the income (or resource) constraint Yit ¼
XJ
j¼1 Xijt for all exporting countries and time peri-
ods, it. Ignoring the resource constraint implicitly makes ln Pr1it þ ln Pr1jt part of the error
2 In case of individual OECD country imports, j¼ 1,. . ., 30 and i¼ 1,. . ., 181.
3 In a one-sector economy with balanced payments, aggregate expenditure and sales correspond to
GDP. In the data this does not need to be the case. We come back to that point later.
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term. Then, the parameterized version of trade costs, ln s1rijt , will not be independent of the
corresponding error term and the parameters of interest, bk, will be biased.
4
In line with previous research, international terrorism is argued to represent such an
iceberg-type cost to the extent that it destroys bilateral trade that would otherwise have
taken place. The latter occurs through the destruction of production facilities and goods
themselves as two relatively minor obstacles and the destruction of business contacts
through increased transportation and travel costs, higher uncertainty, and a deterioration
of trust.
We may write bilateral normalized trade flows as
ln
Xijt
YitYjt
 at þ
XK
k¼1
bkln
~hkijt
 !
þ uijt (4)
ln ~hkijt ¼ ln hkijt 
XJ
i¼1
hitln hkijt
 !

XJ
j¼1
hjtln hkijt
 !
þ
XJ
j¼1
hithjtln hkijt
 !
(5)
Hence, all that is needed for estimation are measures of ln
Xijt
YitYjt
, hit, and ln hkijt. Whereas bk
is the parameter on (or partial effect of) hkijt, the total effect (or marginal effect, or elasti-
city) is approximated by
@bkln
~hkijt
@ln hkijt
¼ bk 1  hit  hjt þ hithjt
 
: (6)
Although the marginal effect of trade cost measure hkijt on bilateral exports or imports
accounts for general equilibrium effects, where bkhit dampens the direct effect of hkijt and
represents a unilateral effect of it on all exports of country i at time t. Obviously, to the
extent that higher trade costs through hkijt affect export prices of country i at time t in
general, the effect of hkijt on the costs of trade of country i with country j at time t will be
relatively smaller. Similarly, bkhjt dampens the direct effect of hkijt and represents a unilat-
eral effect of it on all imports of country j at time t. Again, to the extent that higher trade
costs through hkijt affect import prices of country j at time t in general, the effect of hkijt on
the costs of trade of country j with country i at time t will be relatively smaller. bkhithjt is a
(small) correction factor. The marginal effect in eq. (6) respects GDP accounting and
general equilibrium through a multilateral balance of payments, taking into account trade
destruction (as the opposite of trade creation) and trade diversion (in the sense of third-
country and income effects) through the budget constraint of consumers (see Anderson,
1979; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003).
Readers who are familiar with panel data econometrics will recognize the similarity be-
tween the transformation of trade costs ln ~hkijt in eq. (4) and the so-called within transform-
ation in fixed effects models with two types of fixed effects (see Baltagi, 2008, ch.3). A
within estimator with exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects would transform all
4 We admit that bk would be inconsistent if observable trade costs such as the terror measures at
stake were endogenous. Then, the expected value Eðhijt uijt Þ 6¼ 0. Blomberg and Hess (2006) and
Mirza and Verdier (2008) allowed for such an endogeneity. However, we use monthly data, and
apart from numbers of attacks, casualties, and deaths as measures of terror, we assume that endo-
geneity is a negligible problem here. Notice that casualties and death incidents cannot be planned
by terrorists, even less so than (successful) attacks.
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trade costs ln hkijt into ln
hkijt ¼ lnhkijt  1J
XJ
i¼1 lnhkijt
 
 1J
XJ
j¼1 ln hkijt
 
þ
1
J2
XJ
j¼1 ln hkijt
 
(and would do the same with the dependent variable). With symmetric
(identical) countries, the model in eq. (5) becomes identical to the latter transformation.
Accordingly, eq. (4) represents a quasi two-way within transformation of the right-hand
side of the model with exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects so that a correlation of
ln ~hkijt with omitted exporter-time-specific or importer-time-specific variables is virtually
impossible. Hence, the model in eq. (4) can be estimated by pooling the data across periods
and including time-specific but not exporter-time-specific or importer-time-specific fixed
effects.
In any case, with international terror events or fatalities in t or prior to t representing
some of the elements ln hkijt, the corresponding parameters bk should be interpreted as par-
tial but not as marginal (or total) effects of international terror on bilateral trade.5 It is the
goal of the subsequent empirical analysis to measure the direct and total effects of trade
with respect to terrorism relative to those of other trade costs.
By including contemporaneous as well as lagged terror measures in ln ~hkijt and by meas-
uring t in months, this analysis is capable of avoiding time aggregation bias, accounting for
sluggish responses of trade to terror, and respecting general equilibrium (income and third-
country) effects altogether. Moreover, using sufficiently many lags of the terror measures,
the model may approximate models with dynamic adjustment (see, e.g., Egger, 2001, or
Olivero and Yotov, 2012, for gravity models with adjustment dynamics).
4. Data
We use data provided by the OECD on monthly, directed, aggregate import, and, alterna-
tively, export flows (in US$) between 30 individual OECD member countries and 181 part-
ner countries for all 468 months between January 1970 and December 2008.6 The total
number of trading pairs for which positive trade may be (but is not necessarily) observed
per time period is 5,400. Due to the formation of countries after the Cold War, the number
of pairs is 5,400 only from 1990 onward but 3,146 before that.7 Hence, due to the avail-
ability of trade data, 59 countries enter the estimation sample in 1990.
To approximate trade costs akin to the existing literature we rely mainly on data pro-
vided by the Centre d’E´tudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII, see
Mayer and Zignago, 2011). We use bilateral variables on colonial heritage and distance. In
particular, we employ binary indicator variables for a common border, a common language
spoken by at least 9% of both countries’ population, pairs that have been in a colonial rela-
tionship, pairs currently in a colonial relationship, ‘economies’ being identical national enti-
ties, and, as a continuous bilateral trade cost measure, the great circle (log) distance
5 We use multilateral international terrorism variables for the exporter and importer by month in the
empirical analysis. Using the present notation, such measures would be denoted as ln hkit and
ln hkjt .
6 The data are available at OECD (2012). We refrain from averaging over or summing exports and im-
ports, which is dubbed the ‘silver medal mistake’ of gravity equations in Baldwin and Taglioni
(2006).
7 We provide summary statistics of the variables employed in the empirical analysis in Table A1 and
details on the country coverage in Table A2 in the Supplementary Appendix.
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between the most populated cities of two countries. For instance, see Glick and Rose
(2002) for the use of those trade cost proxies in gravity models. Moreover, we construct
binary variables indicating whether one trading partner or both are landlocked (taken from
Easterly and Sewadeh, 2001), World Trade Organization (WTO) members (retrieved from
the WTO web page), and whether they are members of the same regional trade agreement
(the data have been constructed on the basis of information from the WTO; see Egger and
Wamser, 2013), respectively.8
Although trade data are available on a monthly basis, GDP is not. To construct the
share of country i in world GDP in month t (hit), monthly GDP data are required. We
approximate monthly GDP by using annual GDP together with the monthly share of a
country’s aggregate annual imports to impute hit. Hence, for every country and year, the
annual level of GDP is as observed, but its monthly pattern is interpolated. Notice that
bilateral and unilateral (total) imports of a country are proportional to its GDP at any
point in time, according to the theoretical model employed in this article, whereby not only
Yit ¼
XJ
j¼1 Xijt (as used in Section 3) but also Yjt ¼
XJ
i¼1 Xijt. Therefore, unilateral
imports may be used to ‘allocate’ annual GDP across the months in a year.9
To measure terrorist activity we use information from the International Terrorism:
Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) database, provided by Mickolus et al. (2009).
ITERATE provides data on global terrorist acts, including information on the type of at-
tack, casualties and fatalities, and perpetrators and victims. The data are available for the
period 1968–2008 with exact dates. According to Mickolus et al. (2004, p.2):
International/transnational terrorism is the use or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing extra-
normal violence for political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in
opposition to established government authority, when such action is intended to influence the
attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims and when, through
its location the mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications transcend national boundaries.
ITERATE exclusively focuses on transnational terrorism, that is, the location of the at-
tack, the target of an attack, and/or the perpetrator are not of identical nationalities. Given
that our focus is on the effect of terrorism on international trade, this is exactly the type of
terrorism we should focus on.10
Specifically, we add the total number of terror attacks taking place in a given month
and country. We do so for each of the trading partners separately, which allows us to distin-
guish between effects of terrorism on exporting versus importing. Besides the monthly num-
ber of terror attacks, we also obtain the number of persons killed in these attacks (fatalities)
and use them as an alternative measure for terror activity. Whereas especially in the recent
8 Please note that we do not include a measure of internal wars given that we model OECD trade
we deem that it is not neccessary to do so.
9 As a test of robustness we also used an alternative method to derive the monthly GDP figures.
The structural model suggests that there is also a systematic link between fixed month-exporter
effects from a model that uses imports by OECD countries from all 192 economies in the data. The
monthly time series of those fixed effects is identical to the one of total expenditures on goods,
according to the structural model. Using the such-interpolated GDP series relative to the one we
use for the following analysis leads to a partial correlation coefficient of 0.8742.
10 In a sensitivity analysis, we illustrate that taking a broader view of terrorism by accounting for
both domestic and transnational terrorism does not alter the findings in qualitative terms.
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past international terrorism seems to be an always present phenomena, attacks are an infre-
quent event, at least on a worldwide scale. In approximately 90% of the months in our
sample no transnational terror attack has occured. Nontheless it is a widespread phenom-
enenon as only 16% of our countries—mostly small island states—did not suffer from a
terror attack on their soil.
To gauge the long-run implications of terrorism as opposed to its short- to medium-
term effects, we also construct stock variables of the number of attacks and fatalities by
summing incidents from the start of our sample up to the month in question. We do so by
using the terror source data to account for all attacks having taken place in a country,
irrespective of whether the country was in the estimation sample at that time period.
We provide the summary statistics for all variables employed in the empirical analysis in
Table A1 of the Supplementary Appendix.
5. Empirical results
5.1 Parameter estimates
Table 1 summarizes coefficients which are estimated from a Poisson pseudo-maximum like-
lihood specification for a gravity model akin to an exponentiated version of eq. (4). The
standard errors of that model are robust to clustering at the country-pair level to account
for the presence of equi-correlation through repeated observation of the same country-pair
across the months in the sample.11
Table 1 contains parameters and some further information for eight estimated models,
labeled (1)–(8). Models (1)–(4) refer to data on imports by OECD countries from OECD
and other countries, while models (5)–(8) refer to data on exports of OECD countries to
OECD and other countries. Hence, variables indicating terror events or fatalities for an im-
porter always refer to an OECD country in models (1)–(4), whereas variables indicating ter-
ror events or fatalities for an exporter always refer to an OECD country in models (5)–(8).
Models with odd numbers include contemporaneous terror events or fatalities only, and
models with even numbers include once-lagged stocks along with contemporaneous flows
11 In Table A3 of the Supplementary Appendix, we report coefficients and standard errors for a
zero-inflated Poisson model. Notice that bilateral trade flows are zero for more than 34% of the
observations. The latter would lead to an unjustifiable loss of 34% of the observations with a
log-transformed OLS model as in eq. (4). Poisson and zero-inflated Poisson estimators use the
observations on zero bilateral trade flows in estimation. It turns out that putting extra weight on
the numerous zeros in the data with zero-inflated Poisson estimation does not lead to drastically
different results from the Poisson models which give equal weights to the zeros as to other levels
of trade flows. Log-transformed OLS models (which are suppressed for the sake of brevity) lead
to a sizable bias with the data at hand (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, and Egger et al.,
2011, for the general problems with OLS in such contexts). Notice that earlier research relied ex-
clusively on such problematic OLS estimates. Due to the qualitative similarity of the Poisson and
zero-inflated Poisson models, we focus on the discussion of the former and leave an inspection of
the zero-inflated Poisson model estimates in Table A3 to the interested reader. Alternatively to the
Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator, one might assume other functional forms of the dis-
tribution of disturbances (such as gamma, Gaussian, inverse Gaussian, or negative binomial).
However, the consistency of the parameters does not depend on these alternative functional form
assumptions and the difference between these estimators tends to be minor even in small sam-
ples (see Egger and Staub, 2014).
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of terror events or fatalities. Hence, models with even numbers allow for insights in long-
run effects (assuming an infinite memory within the sample period) of terror on trade while
ones with odd numbers focus on short-term (within-the-same-month) effects. The corres-
ponding results can be summarized as follows.12
By and large, the results suggest that the general equilibrium–consistent parameters of
stocks of lagged terror fatalities in both the exporter and the importer tend to reduce bilat-
eral exports in a given average period, except for the model in column (4). The correspond-
ing short-run effects of contemporaneous new fatalities in columns (3)–(4) and (7)–(8) are
never statistically significant. Contemporaneous terror events (rather than fatalities) exert
no effects at all—in columns (2), (5), and (6)—or significant effects which are difficult to
interpret, being negative for the exporter but positive for the importer. With exception of
contemporaneous events effects in column (1), the direct effects as captured by the coeffi-
cients tend to be small. The positive coefficient for the importing country is consistent with
a rebuilding effort directly after a terror attack. Such behavior is in line with a country’s
behavior in the aftermath of a natural disaster (see Gassebner et al., 2010).
However, one potential problem with the results in Table 1 is time aggregation bias.
Implicitly, we assumed that the process about effects of terror on trade had an infinite mem-
ory (in even-numbered columns) or was extremely myopic with a memory of just one
month (in odd-numbered columns). Either strategy may lead to a bias of the direct effect of
terror on trade as captured by the respective parameters. An intermediate strategy would be
to look at dynamic adjustment to the ultimate impact of terror similar to Enders and
Sandler (1996).
We consider the latter in Tables 2 and A4 (in the Supplemantary Appendix) which are
counterparts to the even-numbered models in Table 1. These tables discern the contribu-
tions of terror events and fatalities during the first 12 months of their occurrence on
bilateral trade. Let us again focus on the Poisson results in Table 2 and leave a comparison
to the zero-inflated Poisson model approaches in Table A4 in the Supplementary Appendix
to the interested reader.
Interestingly, Table 2 suggests rather different conclusions from Table 1. In fact, there is
little evidence of any impact—events or fatalities—of terror on bilateral exports or imports
during the first year of their occurrence. This is even true when we look at the cumulative ef-
fect of all 12 lags. The sum of the coefficients is only sugnificantly different from zero in speci-
fication (1). Moreover, even in this case the sum is positive for the OECD imports further
pointing to a rebuilding effort after terror attacks. Hence, the contemporaneous effects of ter-
rorism on bilateral trade in Table 1 are likely driven by time aggregation bias. The latter may
partly be associated with the correlation of once-lagged terror stock variables with confound-
ing omitted variables. According to the previous literature, adjustments to terror should ma-
terialize at least in part within a year after a fatality or event had occurred. There is no
evidence of that. Accordingly, we would conclude that terror does not cause purely economic
effects through an impact on bilateral trade. This of course does not mean that terrorism is
12 We focus our discussion on the terror variables due to space constaints. Almost all control vari-
ables are similar to previous trade studies. A certain exception are the WTO and landlocked coef-
ficients which seem particularly large. This is driven by the fact that in our sample one trading
partner is always an OECD country and thus a WTO member whereas only Luxembourg,
Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic are landlocked. Both effects are thus
not well identified. Excluding these variables does not alter our results.
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Table 2. Trade of OECD countries with the world: terror dynamics, Poisson, 1970–2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OECD imports OECD exports
Events Fatalities Events Fatalities
Terror (exporter) 0.406 0.026 0.265 0.008
(0.591) (0.039) (0.489) (0.036)
Terror (exporter), t 1 1.143 0.007 0.332 0.035
(0.370)*** (0.028) (0.367) (0.040)
Terror (exporter), t 2 0.248 0.013 0.171 0.040
(0.278) (0.034) (0.323) (0.036)
Terror (exporter), t 3 0.641 0.008 0.569 0.037
(0.828) (0.035) (0.370) (0.034)
Terror (exporter), t 4 0.188 0.006 0.476 0.013
(0.359) (0.035) (0.381) (0.036)
Terror (exporter), t 5 0.218 0.022 0.104 0.002
(0.266) (0.032) (0.368) (0.044)
Terror (exporter), t 6 0.076 0.005 0.429 0.034
(0.413) (0.034) (0.475) (0.035)
Terror (exporter), t 7 0.271 0.012 0.093 0.086
(0.482) (0.040) (0.573) (0.046)*
Terror (exporter), t 8 0.759 0.026 0.003 0.039
(0.479) (0.032) (0.429) (0.041)
Terror (exporter), t 9 1.070 0.031 0.297 0.016
(0.729) (0.034) (0.357) (0.035)
Terror (exporter), t 10 1.274 0.001 0.424 0.035
(0.807) (0.033) (0.480) (0.034)
Terror (exporter), t 11 1.491 0.012 0.610 0.066
(0.820)* (0.039) (0.517) (0.038)*
Terror (exporter), t 12 1.504 0.045 0.398 0.033
(1.195) (0.044) (0.429) (0.035)
Terror (importer) 0.323 0.020 0.351 0.013
(0.587) (0.036) (0.504) (0.039)
Terror (importer), t 1 1.248 0.005 0.276 0.044
(0.401)*** (0.025) (0.381) (0.044)
Terror (importer), t 2 0.169 0.020 0.223 0.044
(0.268) (0.032) (0.335) (0.039)
Terror (importer), t 3 0.648 0.011 0.546 0.033
(0.854) (0.034) (0.376) (0.035)
Terror (importer), t 4 0.118 0.006 0.503 0.017
(0.354) (0.035) (0.388) (0.040)
Terror (importer), t 5 0.320 0.021 0.043 0.004
(0.283) (0.030) (0.377) (0.046)
Terror (importer), t 6 0.125 0.004 0.467 0.040
(0.406) (0.033) (0.482) (0.039)
Terror (importer), t 7 0.299 0.012 0.084 0.083
(0.481) (0.039) (0.562) (0.044)*
Terror (importer), t 8 0.850 0.027 0.084 0.043
(0.500)* (0.030) (0.458) (0.045)
(continued)
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not important. It is well documented that terror has large effects in the political (e.g., Siqueira
and Sandler, 2007; Gassebner et al., 2011) or societal (e.g., Silver et al., 2002; Frey et al.,
2009) arena, but its mere impact on trade (and probably GDP) is small on average.
The latter conclusion is rather different from earlier work on terror effects on trade, so
some discussion is warranted. First, it should be mentioned that the obtained results are not
due to the inappropriate aggregation of countries which are strongly versus only mildly
exposed to terror. There is no indication whatsoever that a strong exposure to terror leads
to a stronger reduction in trade. For instance, we have run the same regressions as for mod-
els (1)–(8) in Table 1 but distinguishing the coefficients between the top 10 recipient coun-
tries with respect to terror events and fatalities versus all other countries as well as for the
10 countries that exhibit the largest variance over the period 1968–2008.13 Those results
are not included here for the sake of brevity but are available from the authors on request.
Second, earlier work had not pursued a strategy of using monthly data, but it relied on
cross-sectional or annual panel data with a much less precise association of terror dates
with trade statistics than is possible with monthly statistics. Hence, there is a chance of
time aggregation bias, which we were able to avoid or at least reduce by using monthly
data.
Third, earlier work did not control for third-country effects associated with general
equilibrium. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) showed that an ignorance of such effects
tends to lead to exaggerated effects of trade costs, and we can think of terror to be an ex-
ample of trade costs in broad terms. Hence, controlling for problems associated with the
Table 2. Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OECD imports OECD exports
Events Fatalities Events Fatalities
Terror (importer), t 9 1.119 0.027 0.296 0.020
(0.727) (0.033) (0.368) (0.037)
Terror (importer), t 10 1.378 0.001 0.339 0.042
(0.844) (0.030) (0.472) (0.037)
Terror (importer), t 11 1.585 0.017 0.539 0.082
(0.809)* (0.039) (0.516) (0.043)*
Terror (importer), t 12 1.636 0.043 0.387 0.042
(1.238) (0.044) (0.434) (0.037)
Cumulative effect exporter 0.029 0.917 0.651 0.529
Cumulative effect importer 0.015 0.958 0.791 0.466
Notes: See notes to Table 1. The sample contains 5,400 trading pairs, totaling 1,921,294 observations.
Cummulative effect reports the p-value of a v2 test (H0: the sum of all importer/exporter terror coefficents is
equal to zero). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
13 Let us use ‘10’ to indicate top-10 recipients, ‘var’ to indicate countries among the ones with the 10
highest variances, ‘-a’ attacks, and ‘-f’ fatalities. Then, these countries are: Afghanistan (10-f),
Angola (10-f, var-f), Argentina (10-a, var-a), Canada (var-f), Colombia (10-a, 10-f), France (10-a, var-
a), Germany (10-a, var-a), Greece (10-a), India (10-f, var-a), Indonesia (var-f), Iraq (10-f, var-a, var-
f), Israel (10-f), Italy (10-a), Kenia (var-f), Lebanon (10-a, 10-f, var-a, var-f), Malaysia (var-a),
Netherlands (var-a), Pakistan (10-f), Russia (10-f, var-f), Spain (var-f), Turkey (10-a), UK (10-a, 10-f,
var-a, var-f), USA (10-a, var-a, var-f).
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log of gravity (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006), with general equilibrium effects (see
Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), and with time aggregation bias, economic effects of
terror on trade are negligible, according to our findings relative to those in the literature.
5.2 Robustness
Apart from the regressions in Tables 1–2 and A3–A4, we assessed the robustness of our
findings along three lines: the lag structure (timing) of effects of international terror inci-
dents and fatalities, respectively; the use of a broader concept of terror incidents and fatal-
ities (domestic plus international terror instead of international terror events only); and the
use of gravity models without multilateral resistance terms to see whether the data, the
econometric approach, or the multilateral modeling of terror (and other trade cost) effects
is responsible for the difference between our (small) effects and the (large) ones in the
literature.
With regard to the timing of effects, it turns out that the results are qualitatively robust
when considering up to 24 months rather than only 12 months.14 Tables A5 and A6 pro-
vide counterparts to Tables 2 and A4, being based on Poisson and zero-inflated Poisson
regressions, respectively. However, it should be mentioned that a few time lags appear
significant when considering longer windows, pointing to some inertia in the materializa-
tion of terror effects on trade. However, the accumulated direct trade response to interna-
tional terror is negative and significant only for the exporting partners of OECD countries
in Table A5 (at the 5% level).
To see whether our results also hold for an alternative more extreme measure of terror-
ism, we consider only terror attacks in which at least one person was killed. The results are
presented in the supplementary appendix in Table A7. Several individual lagged terror coef-
ficients now appear to be statistically significant. The cumulative effects for all lags are also
statistically different from zero. However, the total effect for OECD countries is positve,
indicating further that OECD countries go into a rebuilding mode after the worst terror
attacks.
Considering not only international but total terror (i.e., international plus domestic ter-
rorism) when looking at the effects of trade requires a different data source.15 In particular,
such information is available from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which again per-
mits distinguishing between terror incidents and fatalities.16 Although the average number
of international terror events in the data as used in Tables 1 and 2 amounts to 0.34 and
0.15 incidents and 0.18 and 0.18 fatalities per month for the average OECD/partner coun-
try, these numbers are 1.49 and 1.14 and 1.19 and 2.72, respectively, when considering do-
mestic and international terror combined. Only 13 countries in the world have not
experienced at least one terror attack in the sample period accoring to this definition.
14 An alternative modeling approach would be using a transfer function methodology. We calculated
the partial correlations for all our terror measures and found them to be low (ranging from 0.401 to
–0.003). We thus stick with our approach of identifying the individual effects of the lags.
15 In domestic terror events all actors have the nationality of the state where the attacks take place.
In the literature domestic terrorism is shown to have different dynamics and determinants as com-
pared to international terrorism (e.g., Savun and Phillips, 2009; Enders et al., 2011).
16 Available at National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2013).
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Turkmenistan is the largest among these countries.17 However, it turns out that considering
the broader definition of terror leads to very similar terror elasticities of trade to the ones in
Tables 1 and 2. Hence, no matter of whether we apply a more narrow or a broader terror
concept, the pure trade-induced economic effects of terror are small.18
5.3 Total effects of terrorism on trade
Remember that the coefficients reported in the regression tables only reflect direct effects of
trade costs. The total effect of trade cost hkijt on bilateral trade can be approximated by
eq. (6). This is the case as long as the impact of terror is small so that total expenditure per
country and time remains unchanged. It turns out that the average hit for an OECD
country is roughly 0.03, whereas for all countries it is 0.006. Thus for the average country-
pair one has to multiply the coefficients in the table by about 1  0:03 0:006þð
0:03  0:006Þ  0:96. For specific countries and country-pairs, this can be very different, of
course. For the USA (our ‘largest country’) and its ‘average’ partner, the corresponding
weighting factor is 0.7. However, this shows that the coefficients approximate total elastic-
ities quite well except for the largest economies in the sample. Notice that other authors
had controlled for general equilibrium effects by including fixed country effects with cross-
section data and fixed country-time effects with panel data (see, e.g., Blomberg and Hess,
2006). However, such a procedure only permits consistent estimation of the direct effect of
terrorism on trade (captured by bk) but not calculation of general equilibrium comparative
static effects.
5.4 Discussion
It appears worthwhile to investigate which one of three differences (considering general
equilibrium effects, differentiating between effects on exporters and importers, or using
monthly data) is key for the starkly different results in this paper from the ones identified in
previous research. To shed light on this matter, we replicate the set-up from Blomberg and
Hess (2006) with our data.
In Table 3, we employ an OLS estimator and refrain from transforming our variables to
account for general equilibrium effects of terror and other trade costs and use a binary vari-
able which is unity if a terror attack happens in at least one of the two training partners and
zero otherwise. Although we think that our approach described above is superior, using the
binary variable replicates the method chosen by Blomberg and Hess (2006). Among other
things a binary variable does not allow us to control for different terror intensities. The coeffi-
cients from the associated regressions are directly comparable to the ones in Blomberg and
Hess (2006)—though based on a different source, sample and (most importantly) frequency
of the data. Notable differences between the parameter estimates in this study and the one of
Blomberg and Hess are found only for the WTO variables and the common border measure.
The former is due to the diffent sample (note that in our study at least one country is always
an OECD country and hence WTO member). In spite of the aforementioned differences be-
tween the two studies, the discrepancy in the parameter estimates appear to be small. It turns
out that this alternative model leads to a very similar direct trade elasticity of international
17 The other countries without an attack in our sample period are: Cape Verde, Micronesia,
Greenland, Kiribati, St. Lucia, Marshall Islands, Oman, Palau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and St. Vincent and
the Grenadines.
18 Results available on request.
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Table 3. Replication of Blomberg and Hess (2006, Table 1, column 3)
(1) (2)
log(imports) log(exports)
GDP (log) (OECD country) 0.619 0.561
(12.20)*** (15.60)***
GDP (log) (partner country) 0.726 0.761
(17.54)*** (27.55)***
Population (log) (OECD country) 1.841 1.075
(6.44)*** (4.84)***
Population (log) (parnter country) 1.443 0.300
(14.05)*** (3.94)***
Common border 0.047 0.188
(0.31) (1.19)
Common language 0.413 0.481
(5.65)*** (8.11)***
Colonial ties (ever) 0.574 0.604
(4.44)*** (5.38)***
Current colonial relationship 0.680 0.658
(0.64) (0.62)
Colonial ties (post 1945) 0.976 1.079
(5.92)*** (6.93)***
Same country 0.214 0.228
(0.84) (0.77)
Distance (log) 1.094 1.349
(25.95)*** (36.10)***
Regional trade agreement 0.337 0.322
(6.28)*** (6.29)***
One WTO member 0.008 0.526
(0.01) (1.78)*
Two WTO members 0.051 0.473
(0.09) (1.60)
One landlocked country 0.234 0.171
(4.36)*** (4.12)***
Terror event (dummy) 0.052 0.021
(5.62)*** (3.42)***
Constant 21.858 21.401
(3.82)*** (4.90)***
Observations 1,303,371 1,421,411
R-squared 0.74 0.81
Notes: The table reports OLS estimation outcomes replicating the results of Blomberg
and Hess (2006). Column (1) uses (log of) OECD imports and column (2) uses (log of)
OECD exports as dependent variables. The standard error is clustered at the trading
pair level and t-values are reported below the coefficient. The terror event dummy vari-
able takes the value of 1 if in at least one country of the pair a terror attack takes place
(as in Blomberg and Hess 2006). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
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terror to the one in Blomberg and Hess (2006). In fact, for OECD imports we basically find
an identical coefficient as in Blomberg and Hess (2006, p.605): 0.052 as compared to
0.051 (see column (3) of their Table 1). For OECD exports the coefficient of interest is half
as large as the one in Blomberg and Hess but the 95% confidence intervals overlap: 0.021
(standard error 0.006) as compared to 0.051 (standard error 0.014).19
What are reasons for why the effect of terrorism on trade is actually small? One is that
terrorism comes at a cost and most countries undertake measures to prevent it (e.g., by way
of security controls at ports of entry). For instance, Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT), a government–private sector partnership which was founded in
November 2001 as a result of 9/11, is one of such measures taken by the USA. To quote the
institution itself, ‘C-TPAT seeks to safeguard the world’s vibrant trade industry from ter-
rorists, maintaining the economic health of the US and its neighbors. The partnership de-
velops and adopts measures that add security but do not have a chilling effect on trade, a
difficult balancing act’ (US Customs and Border Protection, 2014). If companies join the C-
TPAT, they have to agree to cooperate with the US Customs and Border Protection to get
checked less frequently, which speeds up entry into the USA (thus lowering implied trade
costs).
The effect of such programs is very difficult to quantify, though. One interesting finding
is presented by Globerman and Storer (2009). They show that 9/11 has had some negative
effect on US–Canadian trade, but not in ports that used the Fast and Secure Trade (FAST)
program more intensively. This program is similar to the C-TPAT but restricted to
US–Canadian border trade.
From a general perspective, the identified effects on trade might be small because we
cannot account for government expenses (for military, security, etc.) to prevent terrorism
due to the lack of available data. Notice that such expenses would modify the approxima-
tion in eqs (1)–(6), since instead of GDP shares some of the terms would carry modified ex-
penditure shares (net of government expenses for terrorism prevention). However, for the
average economy this would still not involve major changes to the results. For individual
countries, the expenses would have to be large (as they arguably are for countries such as
Israel) relative to consumption expenditures to obtain largely different results from those
that have been identified above.
Moreover, one might think that—apart from an economic effect of terrorism through
an increase in uncertainty or in transaction costs—there is a disruptive effect on transport
and even production infrastructure. However, this effect should be small on average (with
the obvious exception of countries such as Israel, Iraq, or Colombia).
Finally, one should take into account that the very nature of terrorism has changed with
potential consequences for its economic effects. While targets of terrorism used to be gov-
ernment officials and business, more recent attacks increasingly target random private par-
ties (see Brandt and Sandler, 2010). Although this might amplify the shock effect on the
population and indirectly increase pressure on government, the associated direct economic
consequences for trade might be smaller.
19 Recall that Blomberg and Hess (2006) used annual panel data for 177 countries and the period
1968–1999. However, this does not appear to matter for the results. What is important is the con-
sideration of third-country effects (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003, for similar insights in
the context of US border effects).
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6. Conclusions
Revisiting the question of whether terrorism bears direct economic costs, this article ana-
lyses to which extent terror deters international trade. In contrast to most of the earlier
works, we do not find a strong negative effect of terrorism on trade. We arrive at that
conclusion by using monthly (rather than annual or cross-section) data from 1970 to 2008
using a structural (rather than an ad hoc) gravity model approach accounting for general
equilibrium effects. Although the data set employed is unique, it is not the reason for the
difference of our findings relative to earlier work. The data at hand permit replicating
previous findings once ignoring the exact (monthly) timing of terror incidents and possible
trade responses. This suggests that part of the ‘common wisdom’ about economic effects of
terrorism is built on results that suffer from time aggregation bias by way of misattribution
of changes of trade in the past to terror events in the future. With our setup we cannot give
a final evaluation of the specific bilateral effects of terrorism within a trading pair, that is,
how does a terror attack of nationals of country X against citizens of Y affect the trade
flows between X and Y specifically. We do cover the more general unilateral effect of
terrorism, however.
To us, moderate effects of terrorism on trade do not seem implausible. Although
terrorism targeted mainly government officials and business directly in the past, it is rela-
tively more focused on private parties nowadays (Brandt and Sandler, 2010). Moreover,
the average terror event is relatively small and, for countries and country-pairs, infrequent.
Certainly, that does not mean that terror does not matter. It says, though, that trade might
be the wrong domain to look for big effects. Whereas earlier work on terrorism and trade
could not address effects of terror beyond trade, the use of a structural model in this article
permits a broader analysis. In fact, the results suggest that on average, the effects of terror
not only on trade but also on income (and, by that token, on growth) are negligible. This is
consistent with recent work reporting no significant effect of terrorism on economic growth
(see Gaibulloev et al., 2014). The special role of fatal terror attacks warrants a further
exploration in future research.
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